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ALICE GORDILLO REDIKER, Appellant, v. ABRAHAM 
SANFORD REDIKER et aI., Respondents. 
j 
l j 
[1] Marriage-Annulment-Appeal.-A wife who appealed from a 
judgment annulling the marriage and awarding her a cer~i . 
S11m for her share of the community property and as compen-
sation for her services to the putative husband, could not 
abandon her appeal from the money award, and the appeal 
was required to be taken from the entire judgment, where th., 
award was based on the decree of annulment and was in-
separable therefrom. -I 
[2] Divorce - Judgment - Res Judicata.-A divorce decree, as 
between parties to the action, is res judicata of their status 
with relation to each other and of all issues that were or could 
have been litigated therein; but as between strangers and 
[2] See 9 Oal.Jur. 751; 17 Am.Jur. 401. 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Marriage, § 46; [2] Divorce, §l32; 
[3] Constitutional Law, § 177; [4] Divorce, § 304; [6-7] Divorce, 
1307; [8] Marriage, § 21. . 
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parties, tlll' decree is res judicata only in that it determines 
that the parties are thereaft~r free to remarry so far as· any 
relation to each other is concerned. It does not establish the 
previous validity of their marriage against third persons who 
were not and had no right to be heard thereon. 
[3J Constitutional Law-Due Process-Notice and Hearing.-A 
decision of any court purport.ing to bind by findings of fact 
of an earlier action a person who was not a party thereto and 
who had no notice or right to a hearing in that action, deprives 
that person of property without due process of law and is 
prohibited by the 14th Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
[4J Divorce - Foreign Divorces. - A Cuban divorce decree, ren-
dered by a court which had jurisdiction over the party bringing 
the action because he was a bona fide domiciliary of that 
country, must be given the same effect as a final judgment 
rendered in this state or in the court of a sister state to 
which full faith and credit must be given, where the pro-
eurement of the foreign decree was not the result of fraud 
or collusion. 
[6J Id.-Foreign Divorces-Collateral Attack.-A recital in • 
Cuban divorce decree that the court had jurisdiction of the 
parties will, in the absence of contrary evidence, be presumed 
to be tme; and where the action was brought in the state of 
domicile of the complainant, it will be presumed that con-
structive service on the absent spouse had been given so &8 
to confer such jurisdiction. 
[6] Id.-Foreign Divorces-Collateral Attack.-The validity of a 
Cuban divorce decree could not be attacked by a showing that 
the complainant did not appear in the action, for although 
this may h~ve been error, such decree was not subject to 
collateral attack where the court had jurisdiction of the action. 
I . 
[7J Id.-Foreign Divorces-Estoppel to Question Validity.-A 
defendant in :on action for separate maintenance brought by 
his wife was estopped to deny the validity of the marriage on 
the ground that a Cuban divorce decree was illegal, where he 
had brought the divorce action and had accepted the benefits 
of the decree by marrying plaintiff. 
[8] Marriage-ValidIty-Subsequent Marriages.-A defendant in 
a separate maintenance action could not invoke public policy 
to require nonrecognition of a foreign divorce decree secured 
by himself so as to invalidate his marriage with plaintiff, 
where no one .vould be adversely affected by the recognition of 
[3] See 6 Cal.Jur. 220,12 Am.Jur. 287, 310. 
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such decree, and where the state had already recognized tht> 
validity of bis second marriage by prosecuting defendant for 
bigamy because of bis marriage to a third woman. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. William J. Palmer, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for separate maintenance, to which defendant filed 
a cross-complaint for annulment of marriage. Judgment 
annulling marriage of parties, reversed. 
William Ellis Lady for Appellant. 
Hahn, Ross, Goldstone & Saunders and Philip Gordon for 
Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-[l] Plaintiff appeals from a judgment 
annulling as bigamous her marriage to defendant and award-
ing her $15,000 as a putative spouse for her share of the 
community property and as compensation for her services 
to defendant during the purported marriage. She seeks to 
abandon her appeal from the award of $15,000, but that award 
is based on the decree of annulment and is inseparable there-
from. The appeal must therefore be taken from the entire 
judgment. (Milo v. Prior, 210 Cal. 569, 571 [292 P. 647] ; 
Bailey v. Bailey, 60 Cal.App.2d 291, 293 [140 P.2d 693].) 
Defendant and Bessie Yalkut were married in New York 
in 1922. The following year they moved to Havana, Cuba, 
where defendant entered the manufacturing business and 
registered with the American consul as a Cuban resident. They 
lived together in Havana until 1930 when Bessie and their 
minor daughter returned to the United States. Defendant 
remained in Havana, and on January 27, 1939, in the Court 
of First Instance ~f the Southern District of Havana, he 
obtained a default divorce decree from Bessie. Bessie was 
awarded custody of their daughter. On November 28, 1939, 
defendant married plaintiff and lived with her as her husband 
until January 26, 1945, when he left plaintiff and 'came to Los 
Angeles. She followed him and discovered that he had 
married J osefina Valle, a former employee in his Havana 
factory. 
Defendant was charged with bigamy because he married 
Miss Valle while still married to plaintiff. He was convicted 
of the charge but was granted probation upon payment of 
a $2,500 fine. 
) 
) 
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Plainti1I brought this action in the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County for separate maintenance on the grounds of 
adultery and extreme cruelty. Defendant was personally 
served in the action and cross-complained for an annulment of 
their marriage on the ground thilt at the time of their pur-
ported marriage plainti1I was still the wife of one Reinhold 
Graf. The trial court found that plaintiff was. divorced 
from Graf six years before her marriage to defendant. The 
court also found, however, that at the time of her marriage 
to defendant he was still the husband of Bessie Yalkut 
Rediker and that the marriage of plaintiff and defendant 
was therefore bigamous and void. It found defendant's Cuban 
decree invalid for want of jurisdiction in that, "said Bessie 
Rediker was never served with process in any such proceedings 
or purported proceedings, if any were had, and no trial or 
hearing was had in connection with any such proceedings or 
purported proceedings for the purpose of divorcing defend-
ant from Bessie Rediker," and that defendant was lawfully 
married to Bessie Rediker until she obtained a divorce decree 
on August 28. 1944. in the Circuit Court of Dade County, 
Florida. ' 
Defendant introduced the Florida decree over plaintiff's 
objection for the purpose of establishing that he and Bessie 
were lawfully married until the entry' of the decree dissolved 
their marriage. The trial court. holding that the decree was 
conclusive of that fact stated: "Now, the Constitution of the 
United States specifically places upon this Court the duty to 
give fun faith and credit to that judgment of the Court 
of the State of Florida. . . . Consequently I am not in a 
.. _.position· to ignore it.-l have' to accept it and as I pointed out 
in my notice of decisiori that judgment carried the absolutely 
;necessary implication that up to the time that it was ren-
dered Abraham and Bessie were married and that at the time 
Abraham married Alicia he was married to Bessie. . . . You 
say that you were not a party to the divorce action. That 
is not a fully correct statement because we are all parties to 
every divorce action because a divorce action is an action in 
rem and that divorce action was presented in this Court for 
the purpose of proving not any of the issues that were involved 
in the case but simply for the purpose of proving itself, namely. 
that she was given a decree of divorce as of a certain date 
and ill my judgment it was very properly admissible in this 
case." ' 
The trial court concluded that in "proving itself" the 
'flOO [85 C.M 
Florida decree proved the "absolutely necessary implication" 
that defendant and Bessie were married until the date it was 
entered and that it was res judicata on that issue. It there-
fore found that the marriage of defendant and plaintiff was 
bigamous and granted the prayer of the cross-complaint for 
an annulment. 
On this appeal plaintifl' contends that the Florida decree 
is res judicata in this action only insofar as it adjudicated the 
parties' lack of marital relationship to each other from then 
on, that the trial court's finding that the Cuban divorce is in-
valid is not supported by the evidence, and that defendant, 
having initiated the Cuban action and having taken advan-
tage of the decree therein by remarrying, is estopped to deny 
its validity. 
[2] Defendant contends that an existing valid marriage • 
is a condition precedent to the entry of a divorce decree 
under Florida law (Keener v. Keener, 152 Fla. 13 [11 So.2d 
180] ), and that the entry of the decree imports a finding 
that defendant and Bessie were lawfully married at the time 
of its entry, five years after the purported marriage of de-
fendant to plaintifl'. He urges that, since a divorce decree 
is a judgment in rem, the essential finding that the parties 
thereto were lawfully married is res judicata in this action, 
and that, since the Florida court had jurisdiction to enter the 
decree and plaintiff does not contend that it was procured 
by fraud or collusion, this court must accord full faith and 
credit to the decree and to the finding of a lawful marriage 
necessarily implied therein. (U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1; Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 299 [63 s.Ot. 207, 87 
L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 1273] ; Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 
546-547 [68 S.Ot. 1213, 92 L.Ed. 1561, 1 A.L.R.2d 1412].) 
He alleges that" a judgment in a divorce case must be treated 
as dealing with status prior to divorce as well as after, and 
the one indepen4ently of the other," and that the res in 8 di-
vorce action "is not only the subsequent singleness of the 
parties, but also their prior marital status-a determination 
which is 'immune from collateral attack.' " 
That contention, however, is opposed to the prevailing rule 
in most of the jurisdictions of the United States and to several 
decisions of this court. It is an oversimplification to state 
that a divorce proceeding is 8 proceeding in rem, and to pro-
ceed from that statement to the assumption that a decree 
entered therein is res judicata in an action between a Par1iY 
and a stranger thereto, not only as to the subsequent stataa 
) 
) 
Aug. 1950] 801 
of the parties with relation to each other, but also as to all 
issues decided or that might have been decided in the proceed-
ing. The weight of authority holds that a decree of divorce is a 
judgment in rem only to the extent that it adjudicates the 
future status of the parties in relation to each other. (Wil-
liams v. North CaroZina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 [63 S.Ct. 207, 87 
L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 1273]; WiUiams v. North Carolina, 
325 U.S. 226, 232 [65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 157 A.L.R. 
1366].) As between parties or privies, the decree is res judi-
cata not only of their status with relation to each other but 
also of all issues that were litigated or that could have been 
litigated therein. (Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 97 Cal.App: 
558, 561 [275 P. 987); Petry v. Petry, 47 Cal.App.2d 594, 
595 [118 P.2d"498] ; Borg v. Borg, 25 Cal.App.2d 25, 29 [76 "' 
P.2d 218]; 2 Freeman, Judgments, § 906, p. 1904.) Estate 
of Lee, 200 Cal. 310, 314 [253 P. 145], on which defendant 
relies, has been properly interpreted in Blumenthal v." Blumen-
thal, supra, as stating the rule applicable between parties and 
their privies. As between strangers or strangers and parties, 
however, the decree is res judicata only in that it conclusively 
determines that the parties are thereafter free to remarry 80 
far as any relation to each other is concerned. It does not 
establish the previous validity of their marriage against third 
persons who were not and had no right to be heard thereon. 
(2 Freeman, Judgments, § 910, p. 1913; 3 Freeman, Judg-
ments, § 1524, pp. 3131-3132; Restatement, Judgments, § 74, 
p. 335; Hunter v. Hunter, III Cal. 261, 266 [43 P. 756, 52 
Am.St.Rep. 180, 31 L.R.A. 411]; Estate of James, 99 Cal. 
374,379 [33 P. 1122, 37 Am.St.ReP. 60].) "We may lay on 
one side, then, any argument based on the misleading ex-
'pression that all the world are parties to a proceeding in rem. 
--This does not mean that all the world are entitled to be heard, 
and as strangers in interest are not entitled to be heard, there 
is no reason why they should be bound by the findings of 
fact, although bound to admit the title or status which the 
judgment establishes." (Holmes, J., in Brigham v. Fayer-
tDeather, 140 Mass. 411, 413 [5 N.E. 265]; see also, Wilson v. 
MitcheU,48 Colo. 454, 469 [111 P. 21, 30 L.R.AN.S. 507]; 
Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 267 [126 N.W. 737, 31 L.R.A. 
N.S. 966] ; Williams v. Williams, 63 Wis. 58, 75 [23 N.W. 110, 
53 Am.Rep. 253]; Pollard v. Ward, 289 Mo. 275, 284 [233 
S.W. 14, 20 A.L.R. 936]; Amt.rican Wnolen Co. v. Lesher, 
35 C.Jd-46 
) 
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.267 m. 11, 17-18 [107 N.E. 882]; Willetl v. HotDell, 168 Ky. 
466, 470 [182 S.W. 619]; Matter o/,Holmu, 291 N.Y. 261, 
269-270, 271 [52 N.E.2d424, 150 A.L.R. 4471; 44 Columb. 
L.Rev. 442, 444-445; 16 Cal.L.Rev. 146.) 
The decisions of this court have established that a' divorce 
decree is res judicata as to strangers thereto only to the extent 
that it establishes the future status of the parties. Thus, in 
Hunter v. Bunter, III Cal. 261 {43 P. 756, 52 Am.Rep. 180, 
81 L.R.A.411], plaintiff, suing to annul as bigamous his 
marriage to the defendant, introduced a decree of divorce 
obtained by her from her first husband 25 years after she 
married plaintiff. He asserted that the entry of the decree 
dissolving that marriage was res judicata of its existence 
until it was dissolved by the entry of the divorce decree. 
This court, however, held that as between a party to the di-
vorce action and a stranger thereto the decree was a judgment 
in rem only in that it adjudicated the future status of the 
parties. "So far and no farther, the judgment bound him 
and all the world." (Ill Cal. 261, 266.) 
In Estate of James, 99 Cal. 374, 379 [33 P. 1122, 87 Am.St. 
Rep. 60], and Estate of McNeil, 155 Cal. 333, 343-344 [100 
P. 1086]. identical questions were presented. In each case, 
a first wife challenged the right of decedent's second wife 
to succeed to his estate. In each case the first wife contended 
that decedent's second marriage was bigamous for the reason 
that his divorce from his first wife was invalid. In support 
of ,that contention, each first wife offered in evidence a sepa-
rate maintenance decree obtained by her after the decedent 
obtained the allegedly invalid divorce, contending that the 
separate maintenance decree was res judicata of the continued 
existence of the first marriage. In both cases, the court held 
that the laterdecree-did'not,asbetweel1 a party thereto and 
a stranger, rein$tate the first marriage notwithstanding the 
intervention of a previous decree. 
This court has also held that an order admitting a wiD to 
probate, although a judgment in rem to that extent, was not 
res judicata of the essential finding that decedent was a Cali-
fornia domiciliary, except as between the parties to the probate 
proceeding. (Estate of Bloom, 218 Cal. 575, 578-579 [2P.2d 
753]; see also, Estate of Newman, 124 Cal. 688, 692 [57 
P. 686, 45 L.R.A. 780]; Biley v. New York Trust Co., 815 
U.S. 343, 352-853 [62 S.Ct. 608, 86 L.Ed. 885].) Although 
severa) decisions have held that the findings in a divorce 
action aTe res judicata as between the parties thereto, they 
) 
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have disclaimed any intention to apply the doctrine to persons 
not parties to the divorce action. (Estate of Hughes, 80 Cal. 
App.2d 550, 556 [182 P.2d 253]; Godfrey v. Godfrey, 30 
Cal.App.2d 370, 380 [86 P.2d 357]; Borg v. Borg, 25 Cal. 
App.2d 25, 29 [76 P.2d 218].) . 
Uncertainty as to the validity of migratory divorces created 
by the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
(Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 299 [63 S.Ct. 207, 
87 L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 1273] ; Williams v. North Carolina, 
325 U.S. 226 [65 s.Ot. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 157 A.L.R. 1366] ; 
Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 [69 S.Ct. 751, 93 L.Ed. 957]) has 
induced many spouses, doubtful of the validity of such a 
divorce and wishing to insure the validity of a remarriage, to 
seek a second divorce in the state of their present domicile. 
(See Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 Harv.L.Rev. 930, 
1004.) The possibility that a trial court in a later proceeding 
may find that the moving spouse was not domiciled in the 
state in which the decree was entered may induce many spouses 
to secure a secl)nd decree rather than to rely on the first, to 
avoid the risk that later litigation will prove such reliance 
misplacec. (Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232 
[65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 157 A.L.R 1366); Rice v. 
Rice, 336 U.S. 674 [69 s.Ct. 751, 93 L.Ed. 957]; Crouch v. 
Crouch, 28 Ca1.2d 243 [169 P.2d 897]; see Powell, supra.) 
[3] The rights of an innocent second spouse or the chil-
dren of a second marriage are not diminished by the findings 
of fact in a proceeding to which they were not parties and in 
which they had no right to be heard. Such a holding would 
be not only unreasonable but constitutionally objectionable. 
A decision of any court purporting to bind by the findings 
of fact of an earlier action a person who was not a party 
thereto and who had no notice or right to a hearing in that 
action deprives that person of property without due process 
of law and is prohibited, by the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. (Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co. (April 24, 1950), 339 U.S. 306 [70 S.Ct. 
652,656,94 L.Ed. 865] ; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,40-41 
[61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22, 132 A.L.R. 741] ; Gratiot County 
State Bank v. Johnson, 249 U.S. 246, 248-249 [39 S.Ct. 263, 
63 L.Ed. 587].) A state court cannot dispense with the 
requirement of notice and hearing by labelling the proceeding 
<tin rem" jf it seeks to make the findings of fact binding upon 
a stranger to the earlier action. A state court may no more 
) 
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make its findings of fact binding on a person over whom it 
has no jurisdiction than it may bind him by a judgment in 
personam when he has not been personally served. (Hans· 
berry v. Lee, supra; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729 [24 
L.Ed. 565].) 
[4] Apart from the Florida decree, there is no evidence to 
support the finding that "the marriage between said Bessie 
Rediker and defendant was not dissolved prior to August 28, 
1944 or at all by or as a result of any proceedings conducted" 
in the Ouban divorce action. The trial court did not find 
that defendant was not a, bona fide Cuban domiciliary; de-
fendant admits that he was. The Cuban court therefore had 
jurisdiction to enter the decree and, since its procurement 
was not the result of fraud or collusion, the decree must be 
given "the same effect as final judgments rendered in this 
state'" or in the court of a sister state to which this court 
must give full faith and credit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1915; 
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 299 [63 S.Ct. 207, 
87L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 1273] ; Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 
343 [68 S.Ct. 1087, 1097, 92 L.Ed. 1429, 1 A.L.R.2d l355} , 
Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 [68 8.0t. 1094, 1097, 92 L.Ed. 1451, 
1 A.L.R. 1376] ; Baldwin v. Baldwin, 28 Ca1.2d 406, 410411 
[170 P.2d 670].) 
[6] The trial court found the Ouban divorce decree in-
valid for want of jurisdiction in that "said Bessie Rediker 
was never served with process in any such proceedings." It 
is undisputed that Bessie was not personally served in the 
Cuban action, but personal service on an absent spouse is not 
a jurisdictional requirement, if the action is brought in the 
state of domicile of the complainant. (Williams v. North 
Carolina, supra; Baldwin v. Baldwin, supra; Crouch v. 
Crouch, 28 Oal.2d 243 [169 P.2d 897] ; Saul v. Saul, 122 F.2d 
64, 69.) Constructive service on the absent spouse gives the 
court of the state of domicile jurisdiction of the cause and 
the parties, and 'the record is devoid of any evidence that 
Bessie was not constructively served in the Cuban action. 
The only evidence before the trial judge on that issue was the 
recital of jurisdiction in the Ouban decree. In the absence 
of competent contrary evidence, it must be presumed that the 
foreign court had jurisdiction and that its recital thereof is 
true. (De Young v. De Young, 27 Oa1.2d 521, 525 [165 P 2d 
457] ; Saul v. Satt.l, 122 F.2d 64, 69.) 
[6] Defendant testified by deposition that he did not ap-
pear in the Cuban action but that he gave an attorney 75 
) 
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dollars and requested him to procure a divorce, and that he 
knew nothing further about the matter until his attorney in-
formed him that the divorce was granted. Entry of the decree 
upon the failure of the complainant to appear personally in 
the Cuban action may have been error, but his failure to 
appear did not deprive the Cuban court of jurisdiction to 
entertain the action. If a court has jurisdiction of an action, 
a judgment entered therein is not subject to eollateral attack 
on a showing of error in the exercise of that jurisdiction. 
"Aomething more than mere error must be shown, in attack 
upon a foreign judgment, to deprive it of force and effective-
ness." (Rutledge, J., in Saul v. Saul, 122 F.2d 64, 68; Bald-
10in v. Baldwin, 28 CaJ.2d 406, 410-411 [170 P.2d 670).} 
[7] Even if the Cuban decree were invalid, defendant can-
not contest its validity. The validity of a divorce decree' cannot 
be contested by a party who has procured the decree or a 
party who has remarried in reliance thereon, or by one who 
has aided another to procure the decree so that the latter will 
be free to remarry. (Bruguiere v. Bruguiere, 172 Cal. 199, 
203-204 [155 P. 988, Ann. Cas. 1917E 122) ; Kelsey v. Miller, 
203 Cal. 61, 86 [263 P. 200] ; Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 
657,662 [161 P.2d 490] ; Estate of Davis, S8 Cal.App.2d 579, 
584-585 [101 P.2d 761, 102 P.2d 545} j Hensgen v. St1bermall, 
87 Cal.App.2d 668, 674 [197 P.2d 356] ; In re Kyle, 77 Cal. 
App.2d 634, 639-640 {176 P.2d 96) ; Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 
F.2d 753, 756, 757 j Saul v. Saul, 122 F.2d 64, 70; Margulies 
v. Margulies, 109 N.J.Eq. 391, 392 {l57 A. 676J ; Van Slyke 
v. Van Slyke, 186 Mich. 324, 330 [152 N.W. 921]; Bowen 
v. Fink, 34 F.Supp. 235; Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355. 
360 [26 N.E.2d 290]; Brown v. Brown, 242 App.Div. 33 [272 
N.Y.S. 877], afl"d. 266 N.Y. 532 [195 N.E. 186]; Chapman 
v. Chapman, 224 Mass. I 427, 433· I1l3 N.E:-S59]; Matter of 
Lindgren, 293 N.Y. 18, 22-23 [55 N.E.2d 849, 153 A.L.R. 
936] ; Marvin v. Foster, 61 Minn. 154, 160 {63 N.W. 484] ; 
MohZer v. Shank's Estate, 93 Iowa 273, 282, {61 N.W. 981. 
57 Am.St.Rep. 274, 34 L.R.A. 161] ; Rest., Confiict of Laws, 
§ 112, pp. 169-170; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws [3d ed., 1949], 
§ 127, pp. 401-402.) Thus, in a suit for separate maintenance 
in which the husband asserted as a defense an earlier Nevada 
nivorce secured by him. this court h('Jd that the plaintiff wife 
was estopped from contesting the validity of the decree by 
virtue of her remarriage in reliance upon it. (Bruguiere v. 
Bruguiere, 172 Cal. 199, 203-204 [155 P. 988, Ann. Cas. 
) 
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19] 7E 122].) By the same reasoning, it bas been held that 
a wife who consented to a Mexican .. mail order divorce" 
and remarried in reliance upon it was estopped from ques-
tioning its ,'alidity in an action to determine whetht'r she or 
her ex-husband's second wift' was entitled to his estate. 
(Hensgell v. Silberman, 87 CaJ.App.2d 668, 674 [197 P.2d 
356]; see also Estafeot DaVIs, 38 Ca1.App.2d 579. 584-585 
[101 P.2d 761, 102 P.2d 545}.) The doctrine of estoppel has 
also been held applicablt' to cases in which a husband sought 
to assert the invalidity of bis or his wife's earlier divorce 
from another as a defense to her action for divorce and 
alimony. (Margulies v. Margulies, 109 N.J.Eq. 391, 392 [157 
A. 676]; Van Slyke v. Van Slyke. 186 Mich. 324, 330 1152 
N.W.921].) 
In Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657 [161 P.2d 490], 
plaintiff sued his wife for an annulment of their marriage 
as bigamous, alleging that she st'cured a Mexican divorce 
from her first husband but that the divorce was invalid fur 
want of jurisdiction in the Mexican court. The trial court 
granted an annulment on the finding that the Mexican decree 
was invalid. The judgment was reversed on appeal. The 
appellate court held that notwithstanding that the defendant's 
Mexican decree was invalid, plaintiff was estopped from as-
serting its invalidity because he had aided and counselled the 
defendant in procuring it so that she might marry him. "To 
hold otherwise protects neither the welfare nor morals of 
society but, on the contrary, such holding is a flagrant invita-
tion to others to attempt to circumvent the law, cohabit in 
unlawful state, and when tired of such situation, apply to the 
courts for a release from the indicia of the marriage status." 
(HarZma v. HarZan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657. 663-664 (161 P.2d 
490} .)--- --- I . 
The New York Conrt of Appeals, in a case similar to the 
present one. reached the same conclusion as the court in the 
Harlan case. AB a defense to his wife's suit for separate 
maintenance, the defendant contended that their marriage 
was bigamous on the ground that he had secured a Nevada 
divorce from his first wife but that the Nevada court lacked 
jurisdiction to enter the decree. Although the court regarded 
the Nevada decree as invalid, it refused to annul the marriage 
because the defendant, having procured the decree, was 
estopped from questioning its validity. "We cannot lose sight 
of the fact that the present defendant was himself the party 
who had obtained the decree of divorce which he DOW asserta 
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to be invalid and repudiates in order that he may now disown 
any legal obligation to support the plaintiff, whom he pur-
ported to marry. To refuse to permit this defendant to escape 
his obligation to support plaintiff does not mean that the 
courts of this State recognize as valid a judgment of divorce 
which necessarily is assumed to be invalid in the case at bar, 
but only that it is not open to defendant in these proceedings 
to avoid the responsibility which he voluntarily incurred." 
(Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 359-360 [26 N.E.2d 290] ; 
Matter of Lindgren, 293 N.Y. 18, 22 [55 N.E.2d 849, 153 A.L.R. 
936] ; Guilmain v. Guilmain, 58 N.Y.S.2d 662, 666; Picciano 
v. Picciano, 65 N.Y.S.2d 410, 411; Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F.2d 
753. 756; Saul v. Saul, 122 F.2d 64, 70; Bowen v. Finke, 34 
F.Supp. 235; Chapman v. Chapman, 224 Mass. 427, 433 [113 
N. E. 359] ; Mohler v. Shank's Estate, 93 Iowa 273, 282 [61 
N.W. 981. 57 Am.St.Rep. 274, 34 L.R.A. 161].) 
By the same reasoning, it is clear that defendant has 
estopped himself by his condnct from contesting the suit of 
his wife for separate maintenance on the ground that they 
are not lawfully married. He was the moving party in the 
Cuban action; he accepted the benefits of the decree therein 
by remarrying; and he now seeks to assert its invalidity to 
avoid his obligations to the plaintiff by yirtue of that marriage. 
"One who has invoked the exercise of a jurisdiction within 
the generlll powers of the court cannot seek to reverse its 
orders upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction." (Harlan 
v Harlan. 70 Cal.App.2d 657, 662 (16] P.2d 490].) Defend-
ant seeks to avoid estoppel in this case by reliance on his 
testimony that he went to a lawyer to get a divorce, that 
he did not know anything further about the action until he 
was informed that the divorce had been granted, and that he 
did not appear in the divorce proceedings. He contends that 
he was not the moving party in the action so as to be estopped 
by his conduct therein. This contention overlooks the facts 
that he initiated the proceedings. paid for the attorney is 
services in connection therewith, did not disclaim the divorce 
when informed that it was granted, and took advantage of 
the decree by marrying the plaintiff ten months later. 
[8] Defendant contends, however, that the public policy 
of the state requires the annulment of bigamous marriages 
whenever their bigamous character is discovered. We find 
no basis for such a sweeping application of public policy. 
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valid in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary. 
(Wilcox v. Wilcox, 171 Cal. '170, 774 [155 P. 95] ; Estate 011 
Pusey, 173 Cal. 141, 143 [159 P. 433]; Hamburgh v. Hys, 
22 Cal.App.2d 508, 509 [71 P.2d 301]; Immel v. Dowd, 6 
Cal.App.2d 145, 147 [44 P.2d 373].) Defendant does not 
indicate how any public purpose is served by the annulment 
of his marriage. The rights of his first wife are not affected 
thereby; she has already secured a divorce from him in Florida 
and will not be injured by defendant's remaining married 
to plaintiff. Moreover, the state has already recognized the 
validity of defendant's marriage to plaintiff by its prosecution 
of defendant for bigamy because of his marriage to Miss Valle 
in 1945. His prosecution could be maintained only on the 
ground that his 1939 marriage to plaintiff was valid. 
"It can no longer be said that public policy requires non-
recognition of all irregular foreign divorces. We have recog-
nized that the interest of the state in many situations may 
lie with recognition of such divorces and preservation of 
remarriages rather than a dubious attempt to resurrect the 
original. From a pragmatic viewpoint, judicial invalidation 
of irregular foreign divorces and attendant remarriages, years 
after both events, is a less than effective sanction against an 
institution whose charm lies in its immediate respectability. 
We think it may now be stated that the general public policy 
in this jurisdiction, as judicially interpreted,no longer pre-
vents application in annulment actions of the laches and 
estoppel doctrines in determining the effect to be given such 
divorce decrees." (Vinson J., in Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F.2d 
753, 757; HarZan v. Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657, 663-664 
[161 P.2 490]; Kraflse v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 360 [26 
N.E.2d 290].) We conclude that the public policy of this 
state requires the preservation of the second marriage and the 
protection of the rights of the second spouse "rather than a 
dubious attempt to resurrect the original" marriage. 
Since the application of the doctrine of estoppel presupposes 
the entry of a final decree, cases involving remarriage after 
the entry of only an interlocutory decree (Sullivan v. Sulli-
van, 219 Cal. 734, 736 r28 P.2d 914] ; Estate of Elliott, 165 
Cal. 339 [132 P. 439]), or with the first marriage unaffected 
by any decree (AlIderson v. Ande.rson, 7 Ca1.2d 265 [60 P.2d 
290] ; Bralldt v. Bralldt, 32 CaJ.App.2d 99 f89 P.2d 171]). 
are not in point. 
The trial court erred in entering- a judgment of annulment 
on defendant's cross-complaint. The judgment is reversed 
) 
) 
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and the cause remanded for a new trial on the issues of plain-
tiff's complaint. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, ..f., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
